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Abstract We report a study of how a Norwegian regional health care agency
directive document was complied with at the subordinate hospital level. We found
tight coupling for the activity and budget requirements and loose coupling and
decoupling for the other requirements in the document. Furthermore, rather than
pursuing their own self- and group interests the hospital actors held an overall
effectiveness logic.
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In this article we question the assumption in institutional theory that decoupling is
brought about by strategic organisational action (Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008:81;
Meyer and Rowan 1977; Oliver 1991). Rather, compliance and non-compliance with
a superordinate directive document were found to be the outcome of decentralized
actors’ decisions. These decisions, furthermore, were more based on overall organisa-
tional interests than on actors’ self- or group interests.
Less than full compliance with subordinate directives are commonplace in organ-
isations; loose coupling (Weick 1976; Orton and Weick 1990) and decoupling (Meyer
and Rowan 1977; Brunsson 2002, 2003) are found. Institutional theory not only
demonstrates that these states are found in organisations, it also asserts that they may
be organisationally functional, thus departing from the (often implicit) assumption
that tight couplings are to be preferred. The explanation given is that organisations
adapt to diverging pressures from institutional and technical environments
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respectively (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Organisational effectiveness, accordingly,
may be contingent upon only superficial adoption to the institutional pressures
(Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008:81).
The question about which micromechanisms actually bring about tight and less
than tight coupling, respectively, deserves more thorough examination than has been
provided in the research. According to Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008:87), “Natu-
rally, (italics added), the prerequisite is here that organizations are aware of the
possibility of decoupling and consider it to have a strategic advantage.” Some
deliberate and conscious processes are thus suggested, such as when managers act
symbolically and talk rhetorically while doing something else or directly or indirectly
instruct others to ignore their messages.
While limited in number, empirical studies on decoupling do give some support to
this deliberate decoupling hypothesis (Beverland and Luxton 2005; Hirsch and
Bermiss 2009; Tilcsick 2010). Other studies (Coburn 2004; Elsbach and Sutton
1992; Westphal and Zajac 2001), on the other hand, demonstrate decoupling as an
outcome of less centralized and deliberate processes. We therefore suggest strategic
decoupling to be one of several mechanisms for bringing about various degrees of
coupling in organisations.
We further suggest that these mechanisms can be described by two dimensions: the
centralization of the processes and the degree to which the outcomes of the processes
are organisationally functional.
The centralization of the processes depends, firstly, on how many actors are
involved and, secondly, on the autonomy of these actors.
The organisational functionality dimension is directly derived from the above
mentioned crucial assumption in institutional theory that loose coupling and decou-
pling may be beneficial for the actual organisations.
Within this framework we suggest that taken-for-granted assumptions can explain
to some degree why managerial directives are complied with; typically that alter-
natives to compliance are not conceived. See Scott (2008:58) who states, “For
cultural-cognitive theorists, compliance occurs in many circumstances because other
types of behaviour are inconceivable.“
We, secondly, suggest that compliance can be based on legitimacy considerations. There
are two basic perspectives on legitimacy (Suchman 1995; Deephouse and Suchman
2008:52). One is an institutional view, emphasizing how constitutive societal beliefs
come embedded in organisations, thus having similarities with the above mentioned
taken-for-granted assumptions alternative. The other is a strategic perspective em-
phasizing how legitimacy can be managed to help achieve organisational goals.
Thirdly, we suggest that loose coupling and decoupling can be brought about when
subordinate actors appropriately replace their superordinates’ judgments with their
own judgments as to what best brings about total effectiveness.
Fourthly, we suggest that less than tight couplings can be brought about by actors
who pursue their own interests at the expense of the focal organisation. Agency
theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) explains these mechanisms by focusing on
agents’ behaviors that deviates from the principals’ interests.
Our study is based on the above described framework and is aimed at developing
knowledge about the mechanisms that bring about tight and less than tight couplings,
respectively. We examined the degree to which a Norwegian state-owned
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superordinate regional health care agency directive document was complied with at
the subordinate level of a hospital and how compliance and non-compliance was
accounted for.
Assuming that the most crucial decisions in bringing about varying degrees of
coupling are those taken by the subordinate actors, our study is limited to the hospital
side of the above mentioned relationship. Since the subordinate actors in the case of
centralized processes directly or indirectly would have been instructed to ignore direc-
tives from the regional health care agency, our approach enabled us to discern any such
centralized processes.Wewould also find any decentralized processes which necessarily
would have involved the subordinate actors. We assumed that the regional health care
agency might hold a variety of rationales and varying degrees of expectations that the
directive documents should actually be complied with. Actors at the regional health care
agency might for example consider the directive to be predominantly or only symbolic,
and therefore to be relaxed whether it is complied with or not. The document might
alternatively be regarded as something that for instrumental reasons should be fully and
unequivocally complied with. According to Røvik (2007:53–54), it is not possible to
distinguish between a tool logic focusing on instrumental effects on the one hand and
a social construed symbolic logic, on the other hand; the relationship between these
logics is inherently ambiguous (italics in original).
Theory
Meyer and Rowan (1977) consider organisations to be the actors in decoupling
processes; “An organization can resolve conflicts between ceremonial rules and
efficiency by employing two interrelated devices: decoupling and the logic of con-
fidence” (356) and “The ability to coordinate things in violation of the rules—that is,
to get along with other people—is highly valued” (357).
Similarly, Oliver (1991) consistently uses the term organisation as the actor when
describing strategic response to institutional processes. “An organization, for example,
may establish elaborate rational plans and procedures in response to institutional require-
ments in order to disguise the fact that it does not intend to implement them” (154).
Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008), furthermore, states that, “Naturally, the prereq-
uisite is here that organizations are aware of the possibility of decoupling and
consider it to have a strategic advantage” (87).
Strategic action is a perfect or bounded rational decision process; the very notion
of strategy implies that actors have some goals or preferences, that they consider the
consequences of alternative actions, and that they decide upon the alternative that is
found to be best or satisfactory to achieve the actual goals.
Considering organisations as strategic actors in decoupling processes, thus, sug-
gests some deliberate and conscious processes, such as when managers act symbol-
ically and talk rhetorically while doing something else or directly or indirectly
instruct others to ignore their messages.
Previous research (Beverland and Luxton 2005; Coburn 2004; Elsbach and Sutton
1992; Hirsch and Bermiss 2009; Tilcsick 2010; Westphal and Zajac 2001) demon-
strate that centralized strategic processes are not the only mechanism for bringing
about less than tight coupling in organisations. The strategic action explanation,
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therefore, is one of several alternatives for bringing about less than tight coupling and
more decentralized processes should be taken into consideration.
We assume that the mechanisms that bring about various degrees of coupling may
be described by two dimensions. The centralization of the processes depends, firstly,
on how many actors are involved and, secondly, on the autonomy of these actors.
The organisational functionality dimension is directly derived from the above
mentioned crucial assumption in institutional theory that loose coupling and decou-
pling may be beneficial for the actual organisations.
The range of mechanisms that bring about various degrees of coupling is presented
in Table 1.
In the case of tight coupling, the processes are necessarily centralized and the
organisational functionality is dependent on whether the directives are correctly
specified (Staw and Boettger 1990). Within this framework, we suggest that taken-
for-granted assumptions can explain the degree to which managerial directives are
complied with; typically that alternatives to compliance are not conceived; see Scott
(2008:58) who states that “For cultural-cognitive theorists, compliance occurs in
many circumstances because other types of behaviour are inconceivable.“
Secondly, compliance can be based on legitimacy considerations. There are two
basic perspectives on legitimacy (Suchman 1995; Deephouse and Suchman 2008:52).
Table 1 Mechanisms for tight and less than tight coupling in organisations
Organisationally
functional outcomes
Organisationally
dysfunctional outcomes
Tight
coupling
Centralized
processes
Correctly specified
managerial
directives
(Staw and
Boettger 1990).
Taken-for-granted
assumptions that
directives should
be complied with
Legitimacy
considerations
Incorrectly
specified
managerial
directives
(Staw and
Boettger 1990).
Taken-for-granted
assumptions
that directives should
be complied
with Legitimacy
considerations
Loose
coupling
or
decoupling
Centralized
processes
Managers act
symbolically
and talk rhetorically
while appropriately
doing something
else or directly or
indirectly instruct
others to ignore their
messages.
Decentralized
processes
Subordinates
appropriately replace
their superordinates’
judgments
with their own
Sub-optimalization,
Agency costs
Organisational
misbehavior
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One is an institutional view, emphasizing how constitutive societal beliefs come
embedded in organisations, thus having similarities with the above mentioned
taken-for-granted assumptions alternative. The other is a strategic perspective em-
phasizing how legitimacy can be managed to help achieve organisational goals.
In the case of loose coupling and decoupling, the organisational functionality dimen-
sion is directly derived from the above mentioned crucial assumption in institutional
theory that less than tight coupling may be beneficial for the actual organisations. While
not necessarily a common phenomenon empirically, loose coupling and decoupling as
an outcome of centralized processes—such as when one or few actors say something
and act differently or instruct others to do so—is quite easily explained. It is also trivial
that organisational actors’ non-compliance with superordinate directives may be organ-
isationally dysfunctional (Ackroyd and Thompson 1999; Jensen and Meckling 1976;
Vardi and Weitz 2004). The most interesting and demanding issue is to explain how
organisationally functional decoupling is brought about by decentralized processes.
These states can be brought about when subordinate actors appropriately replace their
superordinates’ judgments with their own as to what best brings about total organisa-
tional effectiveness. Actors thus deviate from managerial directives when the direc-
tives are considered to hamper rather than enhance overall effectiveness. They may,
for example, perceive the directives as symbolic and rhetorical devices and therefore
something not, or only superficially, to be complied with. The managerial directives
may alternatively be considered as steering attempts, but as ineffective to realize
organisational interests, hampering rather than enhancing organisational functioning.
In this case, actors perceive no diverging interests between organisational levels and
thus consider less than full compliance as furthering both their own organisational
level and overall effectiveness. In this case of replacing their superordinates’ consid-
erations with their own, subordinate actors may find deviance to be fully appropriate
and to contribute to the common good, that is, as “a virtue.” Even if they regard their
considerations to be appropriate, they may alternatively consider their non-
compliance with regret, that is, as “a sin.”
Subordinate level effectiveness may also be obtained at the expense of overall
effectiveness. This is the case of suboptimalization. Agency theory (Jensen and
Meckling 1976) explains this case by the concepts of principals and agents who have
diverging interests. Decoupling in this case occurs because the superordinate level
does not succeed in overcoming the actual agency problem.
According to Røvik (2007:28), there is a discrepancy between the frequency of
citing decoupling in the literature and the number of empirical studies of the phe-
nomenon. Furthermore, there is a remarkably low degree of emphasis in these papers
on the crucial idea in institutional theory that less than tight coupling may be
organisationally functional. The empirical studies that are most relevant for our study
are reviewed below, emphasizing their positions in the above table.
Hirsch and Bermiss (2009) report a strategic decoupling case in the Czech
Republic after the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989. Led by deputy prime
minister, minister of finance and prime minister Vaclav Klaus, the government
appeared to implement a strong privatization program. To a request by president
Havel to slow down the project, Klaus protested, stating that “a delay of even a month
in the program could cost the country millions of crowns” (268). At the same time,
however, Klaus undermined this policy by purchasing large amounts of the vouchers
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that were issued to the Czech citizens, thus decoupling the symbols of free markets
from the actual market activity (269), “The Klaus team may be seen to have given the
appearance of creating new rules and disrupting earlier practices, while purposively
acting to maintain some earlier arrangements. This enabled the preservation of some
of the older arrangements by pretending to dismantle them” (276). Hirsch and
Bermiss thus demonstrate a case in which decupling result from “careful strategic
design” (273). They furthermore suggest that this strategic decoupling is dependent
on cultural factors based on the Czech recent history in which Czech has been
subordinate and taking orders from (respectively) Austria, Germany, Russia, and
now the West (277). According to Hirsch and Bermiss, the Czech citizens saw Klaus’
speeches as telling outsiders what they wanted to hear, following the Good Soldier
Schweik and a tacit understanding that the coming changes could be minimized
(277). The degree to which it is organisationally functional is open.
Beverland and Luxton (2005) demonstrate how wine firms deliberately decouple
projected images from internal operations to create powerful brand images. It is a
centralized case and the decoupling is organisationally functional.
Tilcsick (2010) examines a post-Communist government agency and shows that
the demography and ideology of powerful organisation members influence whether
decoupling occurs, how it unfolds, and whether it is sustainable. Tilcsick demon-
strates that decoupling occurs in the first phase while recoupling is found in a
subsequent phase. The involved organisation members seem to hold quite centralized
positions in the organisation whereby the process is centralized. The degree to which
decoupling is organisationally functional is ambiguous.
Elsbach and Sutton (1992) show how controversial and possibly unlawful actions
of member of organisations can lead to endorsement and support from key constit-
uencies. The crucial point is that the violation of societal norms made the organisa-
tions more noticed whereby their spokespersons were enabled to provide positive
interpretations of the controversial actions and to present their organisations favour-
ably. For our study, it is important to note that the initial media attention activities
were made independent of the actual organisations’ central positions. By not being
knowledgeable about the events, the spokespersons were able to claim innocence and
shift the focus of attention toward the more socially acceptable goals and accomplish-
ments of the organisation (713). The process here is decentralized, and the outcome
seems to be organisationally functional.
Westphal and Zajac (2001) examine decoupling between policy and the practice of
stock repurchase programs in a quantitative study. They find substantial divergence
between proclamations of such programs and the degree to which they were actually
implemented. They also find support for their hypotheses that a CEO’s power over
the board, vicarious learning and prior decoupling practice decreased the degree to
which the repurchase programs were implemented. According to Westphal and Zajac,
decoupling occurs not only because it may enhance organisational effectiveness, but
also because it serves the political interests of powerful corporate leaders (221). The
organisational interests of decoupling is that higher levels of free cash flow can
promote corporate stability while managers will consider the free cash flow as an
opportunity for increased executive compensation and perquisite consumption (206).
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This process must be categorized as decentralized; the implementers are persons other
than the boards that made the repurchase decisions. According to Westphal and Zajac,
the outcome is beneficial for the actual organisations as well as for the involved
CEOs.
Coburn (2004) demonstrates that messages from the environment do influence
classroom practice. This process is framed by implementers’ (teachers’) preexisting
beliefs and practices, however, and by the messages themselves. This study demon-
strates decentralized processes. The degree to which the outcome is organisationally
functional is unclear.
These studies demonstrate centralized as well as decentralized processes. The Bever-
land and Luxton and Tilcsick studies report centralized processes. In the Beverland and
Luxton case, the centralized process seems to be clearly beneficial for the total organi-
sation. In the other cases, the organisational outcomes are more ambiguous.
The Westphal and Zajac, Elsbach and Sutton, and the Coburn cases demonstrate
decentralized processes. In the Westphal and Zajac and the Elsbach and Sutton cases,
decoupling is organisationally functional while in the Coburn case it is more ambiguous.
The crucial point in the Elsbach and Sutton case is that the behaviours of the
autonomous actors enable the organisation to focus on positive aspects of the organisation.
In the Hirsch and Bermiss case, the decoupling seems to be dependent on Czech
citizens’ tacit understanding that Klaus’ speeches were directed to the outsiders and
that the changes could be minimized.
Method
The regional health care agency is one of four such organisations and is the owner of ten
hospitals, one of which is examined here. The various levels, accordingly, are parts of
the total Norwegian health care system, consisting of the The Ministry of Health and
Care Services, the five regional health care agencies and 22 hospitals, most of themwith
several locations. By means of the health care agency directive documents, every year
the hospitals are instructed about what health care services to offer, in what quantities
and qualities these services shall be given to the population in the actual districts, and
what specific organisational aims should be pursued in the year to come.
The fourteen page directive document is a formal agreement signed by the CEOs
of the regional health care agency and the hospital at the end of the year before the
one for which it applies.
In the document, there are some general comments such as referring to the national
level policies and principles that are generally agreed upon, for example that patients’
needs, demographic changes, and medical technical developments should be taken
into consideration. Furthermore, there are several more specific aims in the document.
Among these are the ones included in our study, as listed below.
The document’s general aims, as well as the specific aims, are identical for all the
hospitals in the actual region. On the other hand, the specific numbers of activities
and budget are specific for each of the hospitals.
Compliance and Non-Compliance…
1. Eighty percent of the case summaries from the hospital shall be submitted within
seven days after the patients’ discharge from the hospital.
2. The number and composite of physicians at the hospital shall correspond with
those in a national database. This database is a manifestation of the national level
allocation of physicians. There are some discrepancies between the numbers in
the database and those at the actual hospitals, and the hospital is instructed to
adjust to the database numbers.
3. The research production increases from the average of the three last years and
internal resources of 0.5% of annual total hospital costs shall be allocated to
research activities.
4. The hospital shall participate in planning and development projects, such as
electronic learning.
5. The hospital shall develop specific procedures for two new lines of medical
treatment
6. The hospital shall comply with the regional health care agency’s demands,
as far as the hospital’s economy, activity level, and the division of health
care functions between the hospitals and the health care agencies are
concerned.
7. The hospital shall have appropriate educational activities, as far as medical/
technical equipment is concerned.
These issues were chosen among others for our study based on the criterion of
variability; we included issues of different types ranging from activity and budget to
educational.
Our research questions implied that a qualitative approach was the preferred way
to collect data; we wanted to provide comprehensive knowledge about the hospital
actors’ considerations.
We expected the directive document to be relatively well known among the
top and upper level managers at the hospital and less known at lower organisa-
tional levels. Correspondingly, those at the top and upper level positions at the
hospital were assumed to be those who interpreted the document and made the
implementation decisions for their hospital’s activities. Based on these consid-
erations, nine top- and upper-level managers were asked to be informants in our
study. They all answered our request positively. This may partly be due to the
fact that the second author is a hospital employee. An interview guide with
questions about the directive document generally and about the above men-
tioned seven specific organisational issues was worked out and sent to the
informants in advance of the interviews. Each of these interviews lasted about
one hour.
We acknowledge that this self-report approach has some inherent flaws.
Because of self-presentational considerations, informants are likely to have
over-reported high legitimacy considerations and correspondingly to have
under-reported low legitimacy ones. Overall effectiveness considerations may
therefore be over-represented in our material and agency considerations corre-
spondingly under-represented.
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The informants may additionally have made erroneous judgments as to the
relationships between their actions and their consequences. They may for
example consider their actions to further the interests of both the hospital and
the agency even if the actual outcomes may be benign for only one or none of
these institutions.
The second authors’ status as a hospital employee may also have affected
the answers given in the interviews. The homogenous results in our study,
however, indicate that this effect is not an important one. It seems unlikely
that all the informants would react to their colleague in such a similar way.
In our study, we examine the logic and intentions of the subordinate actors.
Discrepancies between intentions and outcomes, if any, are thus not taken into
consideration.
Results
Quite homogenous results as to the compliance with the directive document at
the hospitals emerged from the nine interviews; no directly contradictory
information was provided. This converging information can be considered as
a methodological phenomenon: the informants may have been instructed or
agreed among themselves to respond similarly to our questions. Even if the
information was quite consistent, however, there were definitely nuances
between the various interviewees, and the answers that were given to our
questions varied according to the interviewees’ focus, reflecting their organisa-
tional positions, and their job experience at the hospital. We assume therefore
that the obtained information from the interviews give us valid information
about the compliance with the directive document at the hospital.
The results of our study are summarized in Table 2.
The informants consistently reported the document to be important. It was
considered to be of varying quality, however, as a combination of general
formulations with unsubstantial value as to hospital steering on the one hand
and very specific instructions on the other hand. Some of the informants
expressed ideas about how the document had been worked out, assuming that
considerations had been made to preferences of the state level health care
authorities and also that individuals at the regional health care agency had
affected the final version. None of the informants, however, perceived the
directive document as only or mainly a symbolic device for legitimacy
reasons. Rather, they considered compliance to be the default option. They
considered their non-compliance with some degree of regret rather than as a
virtue. Typical statements about the directive document are listed below.
“The directive document is of importance. I read it, try to understand it, and to
find the crucial content. But then I cut what I don’t find to be realistic and in
accordance with our goals.”
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“The directive document is very detailed with many repetitions and quite
unstructured. If one expects that we shall take it seriously, it is not a suitable
document.”
Table 2 Compliance with the directive document
Degree of
compliance
Comments
* Low degree
of compliance
** Middle
range
compliance
***
Substantial
compliance
**** High
degree of
compliance
The directive document generally ** Middle range level of compliance.
1. 80% of the case summaries from the
hospital shall be submitted by 7 days after
the patients’ discharge from the hospital.
*** Substantial compliance. Additionally, the
hospital has found an alternative way to
fulfil the aim of this issue.
2. The number and composite of physicians at
the hospital shall correspond with those in a
national database. There is a national level
allocation of physicians, manifested in this
database. The actual numbers of various
physicians in a hospital may differ from
those in the database.
** Middle range level of compliance.
3. The research production increases from the
average of the three last years and internal
resources of 0.5% of annual total hospital
costs shall be allocated to research
activities.
*** More than fulfilment as far as research
production is concerned. Internal
resource allocation not according the
directive document.
4. The hospital shall participate in planning
and development projects such as electronic
learning.
** The hospital has found its own way of
doing this.
5. The hospital shall develop specific
procedures for two new lines of medical
treatment.
* Limited compliance.
6. The hospital shall comply with the regional
health care agency’s demands, as far as the
hospital’s economy, activity level, and the
division of health care functions between
the hospitals and the health care agencies
are concerned.
**** The hospital complies with the regional
health care agency’s demands as to
activity level, economy and the division
of health care functions.
7. The hospital shall have appropriate
educational activities, as far as medical/
technical equipment are concerned.
*** Demands are met, but there is a
discrepancy about this according to the
Norwegian safety agency.
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“The directive document has significance because it is an instruction on
what we shall do. But it shoots significantly over the target on some
issues and significantly below the target on other issues.”
Some informants considered the document to be too comprehensive.
“The directive document gives me a feeling of a tsunami… someone has
counted 150 requirements in the document.”
“New requirements are coming continuously; we should have a cancelling
document.”
“Those who have written the document, of course, do not see everything in our
large and complicated organisation; they are unable to do so. The document
then becomes detailed on some issues. On other issues they have less insight,
and then one gets strange premises and strange requirements together with
more high-level guidelines.”
“Some requirements are unreasonable; they do not make sense because they
are not in accordance with the terrain. When I decide not to comply with what
they require, it is because it is unrealistic.”
We consider the overall compliance with the directive document to be on a middle
range level.
Directive # 1
In the directive document, it is requested that 80 % of the case summaries from the
hospital shall be submitted within 7 days after the patients’ discharge from the
hospital. This requirement is definitely taken seriously at the hospital. The rationale
of this requirement is that subsequent actors in the health care chain of treatment shall
be informed, and it was fully understood, and the hospital nearly fulfills the 80 %
goal. To increase this ratio, however, was reported to be very cost and effort
demanding An alternative action, therefore, had been taken at the hospital: a short
version of the case summaries are issued on the day of a patient’s discharge from the
hospital. The main idea of the 80 % case summaries within 7 days, namely that
subsequent actors shall be informed, thus, is taken care of, but in another way than
requested by the regional health care agency.
“As to case summaries, we are nearly at the target, we are somewhat behind,
but give priority to make a short version to the patients when they leave the
hospital.”
“If formalistic requirements hampers important information, it is unfortunate,
the crucial must be to provide the important facts.”
This requirement is complied with to a substantial degree, but with the important
innovation of the short versions.
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Directive #2
The required correspondence between the numbers of various physicians at the
hospital and the numbers in the database caused difficulties at the hospital. A strict
adherence to this requirement is reported to reduce the working force and expertise
that enabled the hospital to fulfill the activity requirements in Directive #6.
Additionally, the regional health care agency was reported to have admitted that
too few physicians had been allocated to the hospital, thus to a certain degree
tolerating less than full compliance with the required correspondence.
“We cannot quietly accept that our population suffers from too few physicians
as long as there are too many in other districts.”
“The value of the database is highly requested. We acknowledge to have
discrepancy, but this is because the discrepancy is effective.”
This requirement is complied with to a middle range degree.
Directive #3
Measured by the number of Ph.D.s as well as by credits for publications, the research at
the hospital is at a high level compared with other hospitals, and it is increasing. The
hospital does not allocate the required 0.5% of internal resources, however. This was
explained by the hospital’s successes with providing external resources for research, and
the informants consistently report that this is a success rather than a failure.
“I am quite sure that the reason why we succeed in research is that we have
such good external funding.”
Formally, thus, there is less than full compliance, but we nevertheless consider the
compliance with this requirement to be substantial.
Directive #4
The hospital’s participation in planning and developments projects, such as e-
learning, is reported to be satisfactory. There was general agreement among the
hospital informants about the importance of both participation in projects which
bring about network possibilities and e-learning which is found to be very future-
oriented. On the other hand, there was some reluctance to this requirement since the
projects were not considered to be appropriately organized. Tools and methods
decided by the regional health care agency were perceived to be too advanced and
therefore hampering the effects of the hospital’s efforts.
“E-learning is very future-oriented… but this is not appropriately organized.”
“The regional health care agency has purchased tools and methods on a much
higher level than what we consider as beneficial.”
This requirement is complied with to a middle range degree.
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Directive #5
The lowest degree of compliance was found for the development of specific
procedures for two new lines of medical treatment. The informants consistently
reported major challenges with the development of these knowledge-based
procedures. The use of resources to obtain this goal was not found to be in
accordance with the benefits. Compliance would require physicians’ attendance
at five meetings, each for 2–3 days. These costs were found to be out of
proportion for the relatively few cases at the hospital and were not found to be
defendable. Additionally, this requirement was considered to be a question of
professional autonomy. The development of such procedures was found to be
contrary to the individually-oriented culture with more discretion among
physicians.
“The approach of the regional health care agency is not correct, it is total
‘overkill’ compared with our hospital. We do other efforts that affect quality far
more than these elegant presentations. Things do not need to be fancy to work.”
This requirement is complied with to a low degree.
Directive #6
The informants consistently reported that the activity and budget requirements were
given high priority at the hospital and that the hospital fulfilled these demands. One
informant explains:
“There are two issues that we have to focus: Costs and activity.” (The infor-
mant knocks in the table to emphasize this point.)
“This is the only requirement that is absolute and something everybody un-
equivocally adapts to.”
The interviewees furthermore gave detailed information about the quite compli-
cated budget system at the hospital, thus displaying deep insight in these issues.
The rationale for the strict fulfillment of this requirement for one thing seems to be
that no alternatives were conceived. Furthermore, legitimacy considerations seem to
have been made.
“If we have budget balance, we acquire goodwill on other issues. This year we
seem to obtain balance, this is important for the hospital, it gives us scope of
action on other issues.”
This requirement is complied with to a high degree.
Directive #7
The directive to make educational efforts for medical technical equipment is substan-
tially fulfilled at the hospital.
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“We do not do this because it is required in the directive document, but because
we have safe patient care.”
On this point, the national safeness agency has reported a discrepancy case at the
hospital. This seems to be more a documentation issue than a substantial one, however.
This requirement is complied with to a substantial degree.
Our results give little or no indication of strategic decoupling processes. The
hospital informants reported nothing that indicated that the regional health care
agency considered the document as something that should not be completely com-
plied with. The only minor qualification of this conclusion is the reported admission
for Directive #2 by regional health care agency representatives that too few physi-
cians had been allocated to the hospital.
Except for the Directive #6 requirement, the informants reported no fear of
sanctions when replacing the regional health care agency’s judgments by their own.
They regretted the deviances they made from the document rather than considering it
as a virtue, however, and the limited compliance with the document was partly
explained by its inferior quality. The hospital actors, furthermore, did not see any
potential in the document’s equivocality such as more autonomy. Rather, they
expected future documents to be more unequivocal.
A high degree of compliance was found for the activity and budget requirements
which may be explained by taken–for granted assumptions; the hospital actors
perceived no alternatives than unequivocally to comply with this requirement,
corresponding with the cognitive cultural pillar in Scott’s (2008) framework. Com-
pliance with the activity and budget requirement, furthermore, was explicitly consid-
ered as legitimacy-enhancing in the strategic perspective on legitimacy (Suchman
1995; Deephouse and Suchman 2008:52); fulfilling these demands enabled the
hospital to be more relaxed as to other requirements in the directive document.
Most of the non-compliances with the other requirements fit into the overall
effectiveness category in our framework. The subordinate actors replaced the require-
ments in the directive document with their own judgments when they considered only
partial compliance to contribute to hospital effectiveness without being at the expense
of the total system effectiveness.
Agency considerations where hospital effectiveness was conceived to be obtained
at the expense of the total health care system were found in the line of treatment case
of Directive #5. Based on hospital cost/benefit considerations, the hospital actors
were reluctant to comply with the line of treatment requirement. These considera-
tions, however, were hospital rather than total health care system based, bringing
about suboptimalization.
Discussion
Our study demonstrates no support for the strategic decoupling mechanism. The
hospital informants perceived the directive document as a genuine steering document
and not a symbolic device only or predominately. Rather, the informants were
frustrated by the quality of the document, preferring it to be more precise, and they
did not see any potential of an equivocal document.
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Our study demonstrates varying degrees of compliance with the directive docu-
ment at the actual hospital. The high degree of compliance that was found for the
activity and budget requirements can be explained by taken-for-granted assumptions
among the hospital actors and as legitimacy-enhancing; fulfillment of the activity and
budget demands enabled the hospital to be somewhat relaxed as to other
requirements.
Furthermore, overall effectiveness considerations were found to be the main
explanation for less than total compliance with the directive document. The hospital
actors replaced their superordinates’ considerations with their own judgments. Devi-
ance from the document thus was considered to further the interests of the hospital
without being at the expense of the total health care system.
In the case of the lines of treatment requirement, however, the hospital informants
were aware of diverging interests between the hospital and the regional health care
agency. While the regional health care agency had a preference for common proce-
dures and thereby aimed to obtain enhanced quality and scale economics, the costs to
achieve these goals had to be taken by the hospital, making the hospital actors
reluctant to comply with this requirement.
To the degree that decoupling was found, the hospital actors regretted rather than
were proud of the deviances they made when they replaced the regional health care
agency’s judgments by their own.
The main contribution of this study is the questioning of decoupling as a deliberate
strategic process. Rather, we found decentralized processes in which less than full
compliance was mainly explained by hospital actors’ considerations to further the
interest of the hospital without being at the expense of the total health care system.
This is an interesting finding even when the effects of self-reports and the fact that
actors’ considerations do not necessarily have the intended consequences are taken
into consideration.
A characteristic of our study is that it examines a relationship between two
organisations that are both parts of the total Norwegian health care system. We
acknowledge that the examined processes might be different within organisations.
Among other things, we can assume a more distinct we-them dimension between
these organisations than within an organisation (Hogg and Abrams 1988). The
consistent pattern of non-compliance we find here may to some extent be due to this
phenomenon.
In a perspective of preferring tight coupling and avoiding decoupling, the impli-
cations of our findings would be that the regional health care agency should, firstly,
improve the directive documents. By making the directives more unequivocal, for
example, they might be more fully complied with. In fact, this was what happened the
year after our study was done; a longer document with clearer formulations was
issued. Secondly, the agency should make more efforts to overcome agency costs,
such as monitoring behaviors and results at the subordinate organisational level.
In the strategic deliberate decoupling perspective, the implications of our
findings would be that the regional health care agency directly or indirectly
should instruct the hospital actors to ignore or to be relaxed as to compliance
as far as those parts of the document that are issued for symbolic reasons
only or predominantly, thereby bringing about organisationally functional
decoupling.
Compliance and Non-Compliance…
To the degree that the hospital actors’ non-compliance is actually furthering the
total system effectiveness, no major actions are needed. In this case, however, the
value added by the directive documents can be questioned; substantial costs are
incurred by producing them. The question of why a directive document should have
requirements that neither are nor should be complied with is therefore appropriate. In
this decision, however, the legitimacy loss by terminating the issuing of the directive
documents should be taken into consideration.
In the case of agency considerations, decoupling is dysfunctional, and the regional
health care agency should make attempts to monitor the hospital actors.
Regional health care agency actors, however, will hardly conceive the overall
effectiveness and the agency cases differently. Rather, they are likely to consider any
non-compliance as an agency case and therefore as an obstacle. The most important
implication of our study, therefore, is on the subordinate side of the relationship. Our
analysis suggests that, depending on the situation and the level of judgments, tight
coupling and decoupling are both correct ways in which to react to the directive
document. The hospital actors should therefore be encouraged and taught to make the
best possible judgments.
Further research should, firstly, examine the relationships between varying degrees
of coupling and the degree to which the outcomes are organisationally functional.
And, secondly, the relationships between intentions and outcomes should be exam-
ined. It would also be interesting to analyze what issues are not included in directives
such as the one examined in this study.
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